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HELLER’S SCAPEGOATS*
KATIE ROSE GUEST PRYAL**
In the United States, a psychiatric diagnosis, or involuntary civil
commitment to a psychiatric ward—which is considered
treatment in the medical context—almost always leads to quasicriminalization in the legal context. After such diagnosis or
treatment, you are rendered, automatically and permanently, a
member of one of our nation’s most vulnerable populations and
stripped of rights based on your status. In no area is the U.S.
populace in greater agreement over this stripping of rights than in
the areas of gun control and civil commitment, especially in our
apparently new “era of spree-killings.” When it comes to
stripping gun rights and involuntarily treating people with
psychiatric disabilities (“PPDs”), politicians and pundits on the
left and the right are eerily aligned. This Article provides an
answer as to why: PPDs are our society’s scapegoats, the tool we
use to externalize our fear of the unpredictable violence of what
appears to be the rise of spree-killings. Involuntary civil
commitment and gun control work together to scapegoat PPDs:
often the response to an act of otherwise unexplainable violence
is for pundits and politicians on the left and the right to discuss
ways to involuntarily commit PPDs and ways to prevent PPDs
from getting their hands on guns.
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INTRODUCTION
For the final legal writing exam during a recent semester, all the
first-year students were given the same closed-universe assignment. In
the fact pattern, a husband brings his wife to the Emergency
Department (“E.D.”) of a local hospital because she is behaving
erratically. The E.D. psychiatrist evaluates the wife. Because the wife
had been taking prednisone, a steroid, for a severe case of poison ivy,
the doctor diagnoses her with steroid-induced psychosis. After
treating her with a benzodiazepine to calm her, and seeing that she
has regained lucidity, the doctor asks if the wife would like to stay the
night in the psychiatric unit. She says she does not want to. Rather
than force her to stay, the doctor releases the wife into her husband’s
care with orders not to let her drive. Unfortunately, the next day, she
takes the car keys without her husband’s knowledge and drives
erratically, paralyzing herself from the waist down in a single-car
accident. The husband and wife sue the hospital for patient-dumping.1
Their expert witness asserts in an affidavit that the psychiatrist in the
E.D. should have involuntarily committed the wife until her psychosis
passed.

1. Patient-dumping occurs when a hospital does not take appropriate steps to
stabilize a patient’s condition before discharge. See Emergency Medical Treatment &
Labor Act (“EMTALA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b) (2012) (requiring stabilization of
patients before they can be discharged from the hospital).
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Soon after they received the problem, my students—nearly all of
them—came into my office troubled that the psychiatrist had not
involuntarily committed the wife the night she presented at the E.D.
with erratic behavior. They demanded to know why the doctor did
not lose his medical license for such a major oversight. They could not
believe that the doctor would risk the plaintiff’s life and, in this
particular case, legs, over such a small thing as an involuntary stay in a
psych ward.
Of course, the students’ conclusions about the doctor’s oversight
were wrong legally because the cause of action was for patientdumping. By offering a bed, the doctor had likely done his duty under
the relevant statute and could not be held liable.2 More importantly,
the students’ conclusions—indeed, their anger toward the doctor—
revealed that they were operating with a wildly incomplete picture of
what it means to be designated mentally ill in America, a place where
there is no such thing as a small stay in a psych ward.
What my students failed to understand—and how could they?—
is how a psychiatric diagnosis, or involuntary civil commitment to a
psychiatric ward, which is treatment in the medical context, leads
almost always to quasi-criminalization3 in the legal context. A
diagnosis or commitment renders a person, automatically and
permanently, a member of one of the most vulnerable populations in
the United States.
There are many unexpected ways that U.S. citizens are stripped
of privacy and rights based on status (of being psychiatrically
disabled) or history of treatment (of being involuntarily committed).4
2. EMTALA only requires that an emergency patient receive appropriate screening,
stabilization, and, if appropriate, transfer to another location for continued treatment. Id.
§ 1395dd. Because the doctor in this case not only screened and stabilized the patient, but
also offered her a bed in the ward for the night, he met his duties under EMTALA. See id.
Whether the doctor committed malpractice under the relevant state law was a separate
legal issue.
3. I borrow the term “quasi-criminal” in the context of psychiatry from Christopher
Slobogin. CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE: LAWS THAT DEPRIVE PEOPLE
WITH MENTAL DISABILITY OF LIFE AND LIBERTY 19 (2006). Despite the quasi-criminal
nature of the mental health system in the United States, Slobogin points out that “mental
health law is a legal backwater.” Id. Furthermore, “[d]espite the fact that they can lead to
significant losses of liberty, commitment and competency cases continue to be handled by
‘special,’ lower-level courts that are often not even courts ‘of record’ because their
proceedings are not transcribed.” Id. at 20. Basically, Slobogin asserts, “this area of the
law occupies a very low status.” Id. The cause? “The primary reason for this state of affairs
is society’s general disregard for and ignorance about people with mental disability.” Id.
4. See, e.g., Leslie Doty Hollingsworth, Child Custody Loss Among Women with
Persistent Severe Mental Illness, 28 SOC. WORK RES. 199, 199 (2004) (observing an
“increased likelihood of child custody loss for most women with persistent mental
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What is perhaps most remarkable about this rights-stripping is how
many nondisabled Americans actually have no problem with this
rights-stripping, as I will demonstrate in this Article,5 despite their
differences in political opinions on other issues.6
In no area is this radical agreement more stark than in the
debates over gun control, civil commitment, and mental illness,
especially in our new, apparent “era of spree-killings.”7 When it
comes to stripping gun rights and involuntarily treating people with
psychiatric disabilities8 (“PPDs”), politicians and pundits on the left
and the right are eerily aligned.9 This Article provides an answer as to
why: people with psychiatric disabilities are our society’s scapegoats,
the tool we use to externalize our fear of the unpredictable violence

illness”); David Sherfinski, Mental Illness in Youth Could Prevent Gun Purchases in
Adulthood, WASH. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/
jan/7/mental-illness-in-youth-could-prevent-gun-purchase/ (pointing out the Department
of Justice’s weighing of whether to include someone who was treated for a mental illness
while a minor on the national background check system for gun purchases, thereby
preventing the person from being able to purchase a gun as an adult); Lisa T. McElroy &
Katie Rose Guest Pryal, The Worst Part of the Bar Exam, SLATE (Aug. 7, 2014, 8:08 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/medical_examiner/2014/08/bar_examiner
s_ask_lawyer_applicants_about_mental_health_the_question_policy.html (“[M]ost state
bar examiners—agencies that serve under each state’s highest court—still ask bar
applicants about their mental health histories.”).
5. And even some people with psychiatric disabilities (“PPDs”) themselves—they
distance themselves from those other PPDs whom they perceive as worse. See infra notes
124–36 and accompanying text (discussing Andrew Solomon).
6. See infra Part III.D for further discussion of how politicians and pundits across the
political spectrum agree on civil commitment and gun control vis-à-vis PPDs.
7. The “era of spree-killings” is my term. According to research, the number of mass
killings per capita does indeed seem to be rising. But, as I discuss infra, our news media
also now cover spree-killings in a unique fashion. These two factors work together to
create an “era,” or moment in time, in which the shootings capture the public imagination.
For more on the recent rise of spree-killings, see Editorial, The Quickening Pace of Gun
Sprees, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/27/opinion/thequickening-pace-of-gun-sprees.html (“The average annual number of shooting sprees with
multiple casualties was 6.4 from 2000 to 2006. That jumped to 16.4 a year from 2007 to
2013, according to the study of 160 incidents of gun mayhem since 2000.”); Mark Follman,
More Guns, More Mass Shootings—Coincidence?, MOTHER JONES (Dec. 15, 2012),
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/09/mass-shootings-investigation (“[T]he rate of
mass shootings has increased in recent years—at a time when America has been flooded
with millions of additional firearms and a barrage of new laws has made it easier than ever
to carry them in public places.”).
8. The use of the language of “disability” to describe what many refer to as “mental
illnesses” is a sign of progress in our society. For example, mental “disorders” are now
recognized as disabling conditions by the Social Security Administration. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520a (2014). The SSA provides an appendix in which it lists the psychiatric
disabilities that it considers disabling for the purposes of its administration. 20 C.F.R. pt.
404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 12.00 (listing mental disorders for adults).
9. See infra Part III.D (discussing this alignment of opinion).
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of what appears to be the rise of spree-killings. This scapegoating
makes PPDs some of the most vulnerable quasi- and actual
participants in our criminal justice system.
Involuntary civil commitment and gun control work together to
scapegoat PPDs: often the response to an act of otherwise
unexplainable violence is for pundits and politicians on the left and
the right to discuss ways to round up PPDs (using various degrees of
sympathetic language)10 and ways to prevent PPDs from getting their
hands on guns.11
Because, in the context of the scapegoat, the topic of involuntary
commitment is inextricable from the context of gun rights, I discuss
them together in this Article. In Part I, I outline the theory of the
scapegoat and show how scapegoating functions to isolate PPDs in
U.S. society and render them vulnerable. In Part II, I examine the gun
control debate, in particular the District of Columbia v. Heller12
opinion of 2008, to illustrate how PPDs (along with other outsider
populations) are scapegoated in arguments over gun control, in order
to create fear of dangerous people and thereby justify the ownership
of guns. After all, if there were no scary people that one needed to
protect oneself against, one would not need a gun for self-protection.
In Part III, I turn to the emergency involuntary commitment debate
through the lens of the Washington Navy Yard shooting of
September 16, 2013, to illustrate how scapegoating PPDs functioned
to reassure the American populace in the wake of violence.
In both sections, I show how PPDs are scapegoated by
politicians, pundits, and judges on both the left and the right. As I
demonstrate infra, there can no longer be a spree-killing without a
newscaster or politician asking, “Was the killer crazy”? Mental illness
has become our society’s go-to means to explain away gun violence
and thereby protect the individual right to bear arms. But when
reading Heller, and the debates surrounding involuntary emergency
civil commitment, it is difficult to see how PPDs also possess the
individual right to own a gun and protect their homes; it is as though
PPDs are, in Second Amendment terms, not people at all.

10. See infra Part III for near-unanimous arguments in favor of easing the standards
for involuntary emergency civil commitment.
11. See infra Part II for near-unanimous arguments in favor of preventing PPDs from
purchasing firearms.
12. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
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II. PEOPLE WITH PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES: OUR MODERN-DAY
SCAPEGOATS
People with psychiatric disabilities (“PPDs”) in U.S. society are
scapegoats for a variety of social ills, most notably and recently, gun
violence.13 For example, the political left and right have united in
disturbing ways on both the political and punditry fronts in their
scapegoating of PPDs after violent “spree-killing” events, despite
well-respected research that shows that PPDs are not more likely
than people in the regular population to commit violent crimes,14 and
indeed, they are far more likely to be the victims of such crimes.15 The
overrepresentation of PPDs in the criminal justice system, in our postdeinstitutionalization era, most often stems from minor infractions
such as overuse of alcohol or “self-medicat[ion] with . . . street
drugs”16 rather than violent crime.17 Despite the data showing the lack
13. See infra Part III for specific examples of scapegoating of the mentally ill in the
context of particular gun violence tragedies.
14. See, e.g., Eric B. Elbogen & Sally C. Johnson, The Intricate Link Between Violence
and Mental Disorder, 66 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 152, 152 (2009) (studying a U.S.
sample of more than 34,000 PPDs over a four-year period to see which factors predict
violent behavior); Jillian K. Peterson et al., How Often and How Consistently Do
Symptoms Directly Precede Criminal Behavior Among Offenders with Mental Illness?, 38
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439, 439 (2014) (“Although offenders with mental illness are
overrepresented in the criminal justice system, psychiatric symptoms relate weakly to
criminal behavior at the group level.”). Elbogen and Johnson’s results showed that “severe
mental illness alone did not significantly predict committing violent acts; rather, historical,
dispositional, and contextual factors were associated with future violence.” Elbogen &
Johnson, supra, at 155. Indeed, “severe mental illness did not rank among the strongest
predictors of violent behavior in this sample.” Id. at 157. Furthermore, the study “revealed
that people with any type of severe mental illness were not at increased risk of committing
serious/severe violent acts such as use of deadly weapons, inflicting extreme physical harm,
or forcing sexual acts.” Id.
15. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Metzl & Kenneth T. MacLeish, Mental Illness, Mass
Shootings, and the Politics of American Firearms, 105 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 240, 242 (2015)
(“Extensive surveys of police incident reports demonstrate that, far from posing threats to
others, people diagnosed with schizophrenia have victimization rates 65% to 130% higher
than those of the general public.”); Linda A. Teplin et al., Crime Victimization in Adults
with Severe Mental Illness: Comparison with the National Crime Victimization Survey, 62
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 911, 911 (2005) (“More than one quarter of persons with
SMI [severe mental illness] had been victims of a violent crime in the past year, a rate
more than 11 times higher than the general population rates even after controlling for
demographic differences between the 2 samples.”).
16. E. Fuller Torrey et al., More Mentally Ill Persons Are in Jails and Prisons than
Hospitals: A Survey of the States, TREATMENT ADVOC. CENTER 3 (May 2010),
http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/documents/final_jails_v_hospitals_study.
pdf.
17. See, e.g., Elbogen & Johnson, supra note 14, at 157; Megan Cassidy, The
Revolving Door: Wyoming Reliance on Jails for Mental Health Services Comes with
Consequences, STAR-TRIB. (Apr. 27, 2014), http://trib.com/news/state-and-regional/therevolving-door-wyoming-reliance-on-jails-for-mental-health/article_b5792c78-2613-5417-
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of violent tendencies on the part of PPDs, public perceptions of the
dangerousness of PPDs is dramatically high.18 In one study, “75% of
the sample viewed people with mental illness as dangerous.”19 This
misconception stands in stark contrast with a recent multivariate
study that pulled out multiple risk factors, showing that “if a person
has severe mental illness without substance abuse and history of
violence, he or she has the same chances of being violent during the
next 3 years as any other person in the general population.”20
With such considerable agreement on the supposed
dangerousness of PPDs, it is not surprising that PPDs serve as a social
scapegoat.21
a77d-b3ae8ee10c97.html. Cassidy discusses how Wyoming’s jails and prisons have become
de facto mental health facilities for PPDs who commit minor infractions or who are
addicts:
Wyoming advocates say many of these inmates are not hardened criminals. Like
Overfield, many people with mental illnesses will repeatedly commit minor
offenses that are triggered by their afflictions. A drug addiction, some say, is
preferable to acknowledging their own mental illness. For others, advocates say,
treatment is simply not accessible.
Cassidy, supra.
18. Elbogen and Johnson note that their research on the lack of dangerousness of
PPDs contradicts the public’s perception of PPDs: “Such data are at odds with public fears
such as those reported in a national survey in which 75% of the sample viewed people with
mental illness as dangerous.” Elbogen & Johnson, supra note 14, at 157 (citing Bruce G.
Link et al., Public Conceptions of Mental Illness: Labels, Causes, Dangerousness, and
Social Distance, 89 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1328, 1330–33 (1999)). Furthermore, they note
“60% believed people with schizophrenia were likely to commit violent acts.” Id. (citing
Bernice A. Pescosolido et al., The Public’s View of the Competence, Dangerousness, and
Need for Legal Coercion of Persons with Mental Health Problems, 89 AM. J. PUBLIC
HEALTH 1339, 1341 (1999)).
19. Elbogen & Johnson, supra note 14, at 157.
20. Id.
21. Feeding into this scapegoat mentality is the fact that many of the perpetrators of
the high-profile spree-killings do indeed have psychiatric disabilities. But this fact clouds
the issues at hand. Proponents of individual gun rights, such as the National Rifle
Association (“NRA”), argue that all PPDs should lose their gun rights because of the acts
of a very small violent few, hiding that the vast majority of gun violence and gun deaths
are not caused by PPDs and that most gun violence does not occur during spree-killings.
See Statistics on Gun Deaths & Injuries, SMARTGUNLAWS.ORG (Nov. 16, 2012),
http://smartgunlaws.org/gun-deaths-and-injuries-statistics/ (citing Web-Based Injury
Statistics Query & Reporting System Injury Mortality Reports, 1999–2010, for National,
Regional, and States, NAT’L CENTER FOR INJ. PREVENTION & CONTROL, CENTERS FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://webappa.cdc.gov/sasweb/ncipc/dataRestriction
_inj.html (scroll to bottom and click “I Agree”) (last visited May 4, 2015)). Based on
recent data from the CDC (from 2010), 31,076 Americans died in gun-caused homicides,
suicides, and unintentional shootings. Id. An additional 73,505 sought treatment in
hospital emergency departments for nonfatal gunshot wounds. Id. These statistics show
that there is a massive amount of gun violence in the United States each year—over
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But what do I mean, exactly, by a “scapegoat” in this context?
Philosopher Kenneth Burke described scapegoating as, “in its purest
form, the use of a sacrificial receptacle for the ritual unburdening of
one’s sins[.]”22 The scapegoat is a “ ‘representative’ or ‘vessel’ of
certain unwanted evils”; it is a “sacrificial animal.”23 For Burke, then,
the scapegoat provides a symbolic place wherein a social group can
unload its worst: worst thoughts, worst deeds, or worst groupmembers. This unloading ritualistically cleans the social group. Thus,
as James Jasinski explains, Burke saw the scapegoat as a means of
purifying society of its sins, or of removing its guilt, through a process
of “externalization.”24
Externalization can take place in the realm of law-making.
Joseph E. Kennedy took on the practice of scapegoating in terms of
criminal punishment, and, in many ways, I extend his research here to
PPDs. In writing about “[m]onstrous crimes and monstrous
criminals,” Kennedy points out that these groups “provide appetizing
fare for a society hungry for agreement and cohesion.”25 He explains
how, when we associate all criminals with the tiny few who might fit
the description of “monstrous,” “we exaggerate the worst in order to
experience the best: moments when we feel as a society that we have

104,000 shootings in 2010 alone—yet only a tiny portion of this violence can be attributed
to spree-killings perpetrated by PPDs. See Deaths: Final Data for 2013, CENTERS FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/injury.htm (last
updated Feb. 6, 2015). One can observe the data and sum the firearm homicides (11,208),
the firearm accidents (505), the firearm suicides (21,175), and the deaths by firearm
discharges of “undetermined intent” (281) for 2013. Deaths: Final Data for 2013, CENTERS
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION tbl.10 & 12, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr
/nvsr64/nvsr64_02.pdf. The sum yields a total of 33,636 deaths for 2013. Id. at tbl.18; see
Metzl & MacLeish, supra note 15, at 242 (noting, after providing copious evidence that the
vast majority of violent crime is not perpetrated by mentally ill people, “blaming persons
with mental disorders for gun crime overlooks the threats posed to society by a much
larger population—the sane”).
22. KENNETH BURKE, PERMANENCE AND CHANGE: AN ANATOMY OF PURPOSE 16
(1954). For more on Burkean scapegoating in the context of PPDs and violence, see
generally Katie Rose Guest Pryal, Reframing Sanity: Scapegoating the Mentally Ill in the
Case of Jared Loughner, in RE/FRAMING IDENTIFICATIONS 159 (Michelle Ballif ed.,
2014).
23. KENNETH BURKE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LITERARY FORM: STUDIES IN
SYMBOLIC ACTION 39 (1973).
24. JAMES JASINSKI, SOURCEBOOK ON RHETORIC: KEY CONCEPTS IN
CONTEMPORARY RHETORICAL STUDIES 504 (2001).
25. Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders and the Search for Solidarity Through
Modern Punishment, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 829, 830 (2000). Kennedy builds his theory of the
“secular sacred” upon Emile Durkheim’s theory of punishment. Id. at 833; see EMILE
DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 102 (George Simpson trans.,
MacMillan Co. 1933) (1893).
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transcended the many differences that keep us apart.”26 This
exaggeration in order to transcend differences that Kennedy
describes is scapegoating. Externalization is important to the process
as well: “The essence of scapegoating is the attempt to identify the
sources of social problems as external to the group.”27 For example,
we externalize our fear of gun violence by imagining that it is mostly
perpetrated during a few high-profile spree-killings by people who
have serious mental illness (“SMI”). Doing so might make us feel
better about ourselves—after all, no one we know would ever do
that—but it ignores the fact that the vast majority of gun violence is
not perpetrated in spree-killings or by people with SMI.28
In his article, Kennedy focuses on the rise of the myth of the
“monstrous criminal” in the 1980s and 1990s and the concurrent rise
in severe punishments in the U.S. criminal justice system during those
decades.29 However, his observations about the function of
scapegoating are now appropriate in what I suggest is our new age of
the spree-killing.30 Spree-killings create a similar sort of shared feeling
of out-of-control violation as that described by Kennedy.31 And the
externalized scapegoat that captures the imagination of the in-group
are PPDs—the mentally ill, the psycho-killers, the madmen. The
nightmare of PPDs with guns provides the social “cohesion” that
Kennedy describes, allowing the crossing of political aisles by folks
who might not otherwise do so. Scapegoats provide an opportunity
for political unification.
The two proposals that unify nearly all political groups in the
United States against this new scapegoat are stripping otherwiseprotected Second Amendment gun rights from PPDs, discussed in
Part II, and easing the emergency involuntary civil commitment

26. Kennedy, supra note 25, at 830.
27. Id. at 833.
28. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
29. See Kennedy, supra note 25, at 831–32.
30. For more on the term “spree-killings” and my suggestion about its newness, see
supra note 7.
31. For example, after the spree-killing in Tucson, Arizona, Time ran an article to
help ease readers’ feelings of out-of-controlness. Kate Pickert & John Cloud, If You Think
Someone Is Mentally Ill: Loughner’s Six Warning Signs, TIME (Jan. 11, 2011),
http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2041733,00.html. The article leads with
questions echoing the public sentiment after the shooting: “What signs that trouble lay
ahead were missed? What signs were observed but ignored? In short, what can be done to
prevent a potentially ill or unstable person from harming others?” Id. It then provides a
numbered list of the “six warning signs in Loughner” that readers can look for in their own
coworkers or classmates to ostensibly prevent future spree-killings. Id.
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standard, what some euphemistically refer to as “increased mental
health intervention,” discussed in Part III.
III. SCAPEGOATS AND GUN RIGHTS
In the area of gun rights, paradoxically, there is a conjunction
between the policies of the left and the right as they relate to people
with psychiatric disabilities (“PPDs”). The left favors gun regulations
to begin with,32 so regulation of PPDs’ gun rights fits with their
preexisting disposition. The right wants to limit the regulation of
guns, so they have an incentive to blame problems of gun violence on
a relatively small set of people and, thus, leave the rest relatively
unregulated.33

32. For example, after the spree-killing in Newtown, Connecticut, in December 2012,
Democratic President Barack Obama, Democratic Vice President Joe Biden, and former
Democratic Congresswoman Gabby Giffords (herself wounded in a spree-killing in
Arizona in 2011), campaigned for tighter background check laws for gun purchases.
Republicans in Congress defeated the bill in April 2013. Howard Kurtz, Senate Defeats
Background Checks, DAILY BEAST (Apr. 17, 2014), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/
2013/04/17/senate-defeats-background-checks.html.
33. This blame shifting played out vividly in the case of an Arlington, Texas, opencarry activist, Veronica Dunnachie, who murdered her husband and her stepdaughter over
marital issues on December 10, 2014. Domingo Ramirez, Jr., Affidavit: Domestic Dispute
Led to 2 Deaths in Arlington, STAR-TELEGRAM (Dec. 11, 2014, 2:22 PM), http://www.startelegram.com/news/local/crime/article4428614.html. Dunnachie was “an active member of
the Open Carry Tarrant County organization,” but the open carry and other gun rights
organizations that she had supported were quick to ostracize her. See Dan Solomon, After
an Open Carry Tarrant County Member Was Charged with Shooting Her Husband and His
Daughter, All Sides of the Gun Debate Got Ugly, TEX. MONTHLY (Dec. 15, 2014),
http://www.texasmonthly.com/daily-post/after-open-carry-tarrant-county-member-wascharged-shooting-her-husband-and-his-daughter. The gun rights blog BearingArms.com
scapegoated Dunnachie in classic fashion, pushing her out of the in-group and into the
realm of the outsiders who do not deserve to own guns: “[T]he story about Dunnachie
runs with the headline ‘BAD APPLE’ in all capital letters, suggesting that she’s an outlier
who in no way represents the group.” Id. The blog then ran this statement:
There are 100 million gun owners in the United States, and millions of them
belong to Second Amendment groups. They are far more law-abiding that [sic] the
average citizen, a fact that citizen control cultists religiously ignore. The reality of
the matter is that the vast majority of the violently mentally ill involved in the
debate are on the side of gun control. They often support gun control
because . . . they are too mentally unstable to own and use firearms responsibly,
and they project their deficiencies upon the rest of the world.
Bob Owens, BAD APPLE: Texas Open Carry Supporter Arrested for Double Homicide,
BEARINGARMS.COM (Dec. 12, 2014, 10:24 AM), http://bearingarms.com/bad-apple-texasopen-carry-supporter-arrested-double-homicide/. Thus, the group sets the fault-lines of
the debate firmly with the sane and gun-toting on one side, and the mentally ill—cast in as
bizarre a light as possible—on the other.
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Thus, for the political right (which includes the majority of
Justices in the Heller opinion), the Second Amendment right to keep
and bear arms rests, rhetorically, on the backs of those groups who
are forbidden to do so. Put simply, in Heller, there would be no need
for guns for self-protection if there were no outsiders—scapegoats—
that one needed protection against. These scapegoats include, among
others, PPDs. As I will discuss in this section, PPDs are thus
scapegoated in the era of spree-killings by having their gun rights
stripped away.34
Justice Scalia enumerated our society’s gun-scapegoats in the
majority opinion in Heller, in which he first pointed to other
scapegoats throughout Anglo-American legal history. Historically, in
England, Catholics who did not attend Church of England services
were banned from “universal” (i.e., Protestant) gun ownership.35
More recently, in the post-Civil War period in the United States, laws
in the former slave states banned African Americans from owning
guns.36 These groups—Catholics, African Americans, and the others
Scalia lists—provided the externalized scapegoats for their particular
societies at their particular points in history.
Today, the groups that serve as scapegoats to maintain our
Second Amendment individual right to bear arms, as articulated by
Justice Scalia in Heller, include felons37 and, for the purposes of this
section, those labeled by the courts as “mentally ill.” When we argue
for the rights of the majority by stripping rights—with near unanimity
of those making the rights-stripping argument—from a disfavored
minority, we are scapegoating.
34. Others have addressed this topic from other angles, for example, the risk of
suicide that PPDs present should allow for the restriction of their gun rights. See generally
Fredrick E. Vars & Amanda Adcock Young, Do the Mentally Ill Have a Right to Bear
Arms?, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (2013) (arguing that the risk of suicide that PPDs
present should allow for the restriction of their gun rights); Fredrick E. Vars, SymptomBased Gun Control, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1633 (2014) (suggesting that PPDs who are
psychotic should lose their gun rights); Frederick E. Vars, Putting Arms at Arm’s Length:
Precommitment Against Suicide (Univ. of Ala. Legal Studies Research, Paper No.
2500291, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2500291
(proposing the creation of a voluntary, confidential, federal-background check system that
those at risk of suicide could add their names to as a means of protecting themselves from
future self-harm by guns).
35. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 582 (2008).
36. Id. at 614–15.
37. The U.S. Code forbids the sale of firearms to felons, 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1) (2012);
it also makes it unlawful for felons “to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce,
or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm
or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.”
Id. § 922(g)(1).
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For example, according to Wayne LaPierre, executive vice
president of the National Rifle Association (“NRA”), individual gun
ownership is indeed a right, just not a right that “homicidal maniacs”
possess—a classic rhetorical scapegoating,38 and one that is often
echoed by NRA supporters.39 LaPierre’s volatile (and ableist40)
language is reflected, in more muted tones, in the Heller opinion
itself. Surprisingly, it is reflected not only in the opinion of the
conservative majority, but also in the opinions of the liberal wing of
the bench, as I demonstrate in Part II.B.
A. Scalia’s Majority Opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller
Scalia states, at the beginning of Part III of his majority opinion
in Heller, “Like most rights, the right secured by the Second
Amendment is not unlimited.”41 He then proceeds to enumerate what
might, in the majority’s view, constitute valid limitations on people
who can own guns: “Although we do not undertake an exhaustive
historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment,
nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally
ill.”42 Scalia then extends his prohibitions from certain people to
certain locales, allowing for “laws forbidding the carrying of firearms
in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings.”43 In
opposition to these locale limitations and these human scapegoats,
Scalia sets up an in-group with a locale to stimulate fear: “And
whatever else [the Second Amendment] leaves to future evaluation, it
surely elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding,
responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”44 In
Table 1, I have created a visual map of Scalia’s arguments.
38. See NRA Chief Criticizes Navy Yard for Being ‘Unprotected’ Before Mass
Shooting, REUTERS (Sept. 22, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/22/us-usaguns-idUSBRE98L0C920130922 [hereinafter LaPierre Comments].
39. See, e.g., Owens, supra note 33. The gun-rights group BearingArms.com writes
that the mentally ill support gun control because they “are too mentally unstable to own
and use firearms responsibly.” Id. This is an odd argument for the pro-gun group to make,
to be sure, as the position they attribute to “the mentally ill” seems quite logical—that is,
voluntarily giving up one’s guns when one knows one cannot use them responsibly.
40. “Ableism is a form of discrimination or prejudice against individuals with physical,
mental, or developmental disabilities that is characterized by the belief that these
individuals need to be fixed or cannot function as full members of society.” Laura Smith,
Pamela F. Foley & Michael P. Chaney, Addressing Classism, Ableism, and Heterosexism in
Counselor Education, 86 J. COUNSELING & DEV. 303, 304 (2008).
41. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 635 (emphasis added).
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Table 1: Rhetorical Fear Tactics in Heller Majority Opinion
In-Group: Not Okay
to Ban Guns

Scapegoat: Okay to
Ban Guns

Disability Status

Able-Minded

Mentally Ill

Criminal Status

Law-Abiding

Criminal

Locale to Stimulate
Fear

Hearth and Home

Schools,
Government
Buildings

In Part IV of the opinion, shortly after this enumeration of these
valid limitations of the Second Amendment, Scalia turned his focus
“to the law at issue here,” the portions of the District of Columbia
gun ordinance that banned handguns and required trigger locks.45
Thus, the law had two main elements at issue in the Heller case: (1) a
total ban of handguns, including handguns in the home;46 and (2) a
requirement that all lawful firearms in the home (e.g., shotguns) be
disassembled or bound by a trigger lock at all times.47
Scalia’s take on these laws, and the rights that they supposedly
violated, looked like this: “[T]he inherent right of self-defense has
been central to the Second Amendment right. The handgun ban
amounts to a prohibition of an entire class of ‘arms’ that is
overwhelmingly chosen by American society for that lawful
purpose.”48 Thus, he attacks the first part of the law for its targeting of
handguns. Scalia continues: “The prohibition extends, moreover, to
the home, where the need for defense of self, family, and property is
most acute.”49 Here, Scalia calls on the rhetorical commonplace of the
“home,” the family, the sacredness of the hearth, in order to craft
agreement in his audience with his argument that banning a certain
gun (a handgun) in a certain place (the home) does not fit into that
45. Id. at 628; see also Firearms Control Regulations Act of 1975, 23 D.C. Reg. 1091,
1097, 1129 (July 23, 1976) (banning handguns and requiring trigger locks).
46. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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class of Second Amendment exceptions he described in Part III (e.g.,
schools and government buildings). By calling upon the commonplace
of the home, Scalia invokes fear of home invaders to emotionally
persuade his readers to agree with him, and ultimately, to agree that
the gun ban should be struck down.
But there is another undercurrent of fear at play here, one that
Scalia may or may not be playing on consciously (although, as he is a
master rhetorician, I would think his rhetorical moves are
intentional). Scalia invokes fear in passing with his list of exceptions
to the Second Amendment: fear of felons (via gun bans for felons),
fear of harm to our children (via gun bans near schools), and, for my
purposes here, fear of mental illness (via gun bans for PPDs). Scalia
scapegoated two classes of persons—felons and PPDs—to justify the
free flow of handguns to the rest of the American populace. It is fear
of the mentally ill that justifies the stripping of their Second
Amendment rights. Scalia does not point to any scientific studies
linking the gun violence to mental illness, which would be difficult, as
most studies show less of a link between gun violence and mental
illness, as I have shown previously in this Article.50 Instead, Scalia
employs calm language pointing to the “longstanding prohibitions on
the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill,”51 never
doubting that his readers agree that such laws are not only
constitutional but also good policy.
Not only did Scalia’s scapegoating technique create fear to justify
the stripping of gun rights from PPDs, it also created a cohesive
insider group populated with non-PPDs, a classic rhetorical move,
setting up an us-versus-them dichotomy, where the “them” are quite
scary to many people. Although Scalia did not call PPDs “homicidal
maniacs on the street” like LaPierre did,52 he touched on the same
pressure point of fear with his language in the opinion when setting
up his scapegoating dichotomy. And—here is the final twist—this fear
in turn justifies gun ownership by the in-group, because the in-group
now has a reason to own guns for personal defense: the scapegoat.
Scalia thus subtly plants in his readers’ minds the notion that
such bans on guns for felons and mentally ill exist because those

50. See supra notes 14 and 21 and accompanying text; see also Metzl & MacLeish,
supra note 15, at 241 (“Databases that track gun homicides, such as the National Center
for Health Statistics . . . show that fewer than 5% of the 120,000 gun-related killings in the
United States between 2001 and 2010 were perpetrated by people diagnosed with mental
illness.”).
51. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.
52. See LaPierre Comments, supra note 38.
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people, when they get their hands on guns, commit unspeakable
acts—at least in the mythos of the scapegoat. And fundamental rights
to gun ownership for nonfelons and non-PPDs exist for those groups
to protect themselves, at least in part, against the scary, scapegoated
outsiders. (I remind readers once more that most acts of gun violence
are not committed by homicidal maniacs on the street,53 despite what
Scalia and LaPierre would like us to believe.)
B.

Breyer’s Dissenting Opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller

In his dissent, Justice Breyer (joined by Stevens, Souter, and
Ginsburg—the liberal wing of the bench in 2008) agreed with Justice
Scalia that the Second Amendment right “is not absolute.”54 Like
Scalia’s opinion, Breyer’s opinion is laced with fear, noting at the
outset that the District’s gun ban was a “permissible legislative
response to a serious, indeed life-threatening, problem.”55 In Breyer’s
opinion, the fear is of firearms themselves, in particular firearms
possessed by a particular class of people who are dangerous.56 The
opening to his opinion invokes this class of people: “[T]he District’s
regulation . . . focuses upon the presence of handguns in high-crime
urban areas.”57 And he closes his opinion similarly: “[T]here simply is
no untouchable constitutional right guaranteed by the Second

53. See Ramirez, supra note 33 (describing a December 2014 killing of a man and his
daughter by the man’s estranged wife); supra note 21 and accompanying text
(enumerating statistics on gun violence generally, demonstrating how most gun killings
and injuries do not occur during high profile spree-killings); see also Lauren Kirchner, The
Very Weak and Complicated Links Between Mental Illness and Gun Violence, PAC.
STANDARD (Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.psmag.com/navigation/health-and-behavior/weakcomplicated-links-mental-illness-gun-violence-96672 (finding those who have mental
illness are less likely to commit gun violence). Kirchner interviewed social scientist
Jonathan Metzl, author of a recent study on mental health and gun violence, who found,
“[I]f somebody has a long-term, chronic mental illness diagnosis, they are actually less
likely to commit a gun crime. It’s exactly the opposite of what you would think in the
aftermath of these [spree-killing] shootings.” Id.
54. Heller, 554 U.S. at 681 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also wrote a
dissenting opinion, but his opinion specifically addressed “[w]hether [the Second
Amendment] protects the right to possess and use guns for nonmilitary purposes like
hunting and personal self-defense.” Id. at 636–37 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For this reason,
Stevens’s opinion does not invoke the scapegoat. Breyer, on the other hand, states that he
concurs with Stevens, and then provides this purpose for his opinion: “I shall show that the
District’s law is consistent with the Second Amendment even if that Amendment is
interpreted as protecting a wholly separate interest in individual self-defense.” Id. at 681
(Breyer, J., dissenting). In order to do so, as I demonstrate in this section, Breyer does
invoke the scapegoat.
55. Id. at 682.
56. Id. at 681.
57. Id.
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Amendment to keep loaded handguns in the house in crime-ridden
urban areas.”58
The phrase “crime-ridden urban areas” invokes many things, but
one cannot say that it is free of racial implications. Breyer’s words
participate implicitly in Scalia’s scapegoating. In this instance, Breyer
uses the term “urban” as code for black criminals, scapegoating this
particular group as a way to justify the D.C. gun ban in particular:
The law is tailored to the urban crime problem in that it is local
in scope and thus affects only a geographic area both limited in
size and entirely urban; the law concerns handguns, which are
specially linked to urban gun deaths and injuries, and which are
the overwhelmingly favorite weapon of armed criminals.59
With these words, Breyer uses fear to make his point as aptly as
Scalia does.
Breyer does not agree with Scalia that guns are necessary to
protect against these dangerous outsider groups; however, Breyer
does agree that certain groups are dangerous. His solution, therefore,
is that the gun ban should stand to ensure that these dangerous
groups—such as urban criminals—cannot get their hands on guns.60
Put another way, Breyer never disagrees with Scalia’s assessment of
dangerous groups; he only disagrees that these groups should serve as
exceptions to the rule that the rest should be able to possess guns: “I
am similarly puzzled by the majority’s list, in Part III of its opinion, of
provisions that in its view would survive Second Amendment
scrutiny.”61 These include, he states, quoting Justice Scalia:
“ ‘prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons’ ” and
“ ‘prohibitions on the possession of firearms by . . . the mentally
ill.’ ”62 Breyer takes Scalia to task for this list, pointing out the flaws in
Scalia’s interpretation of the scope of the Second Amendment: “Why
these? Is it that similar restrictions existed in the late 18th century?
The majority fails to cite any colonial analogues. And even were it
possible to find analogous colonial laws in respect to all these
restrictions, why should these colonial laws count . . . ?”63 But Breyer

58. Id. at 722.
59. Id. at 682.
60. Id. (“[A] legislature could reasonably conclude that the law will advance goals of
great public importance, namely, saving lives, preventing injury, and reducing crime. The
law is tailored to the urban crime problem in that it is local in scope and thus affects only a
geographic area both limited in size and entirely urban.”).
61. Id. at 721.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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is not arguing against Scalia’s list because he believes that felons and
the mentally ill should be allowed to possess guns. He is simply
pointing out the flaw in Scalia’s reasoning that suggests that gun
possession is a universal right—universal with a few named
exceptions.
Thus, what Breyer does not do is contemplate the invalidity of
the list in the first place—only the interpretative dance that brought
Scalia to the point of needing to provide a list of exceptions at all.
Indeed, Breyer does not argue that this list should be shortened; on
the contrary, he seems to believe that this list should be lengthened
and only quarrels with the fact that Scalia limits it to only those
particular people. Breyer never suggests that the mentally ill should
not be singled out as a group that is particularly dangerous. Indeed,
his opinion is just as fear-ridden as the majority opinion.
C.

Scapegoating and Guns: Taking Aim at the Wrong Problem

Both Scalia’s and Breyer’s opinions show that legal arguments
both for and against gun control rely on fear, in particular fear of
people believed to be dangerous. This use of fear to further one’s
political aims is scapegoating.
Not only is scapegoating the mentally ill and other groups in
order to further a political agenda or make legal arguments
distasteful, it results in bad policy. The policy problems that arise
from stripping gun rights from the mentally ill in the fashion that the
Heller majority contemplates are these: (1) the majority opinion
targets the wrong group of PPDs in our society’s quest to cure gun
violence and (2) targeting PPDs as the cause of gun violence will
scare off PPDs from seeking treatment.
In more ways than one, the majority opinion in Heller targets the
wrong group of PPDs in its quest for constitutional gun control.
Unlike felons, whose status of “felon” derives from their interaction
with the state, PPDs’ status of “mentally ill” is not so easily marked.
Thus, like other forms of restrictions on PPDs (such as those that
arise during bar examinations64), the restriction on gun ownership by
a PPD relies first upon the PPD having received treatment for a
psychiatric disability. For the purposes of the federal gun control
statute, a PPD must have either been “adjudicated as a mental
defective or . . . been committed to any mental institution,”65 or be
either “an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance
64. See McElroy & Pryal, supra note 4.
65. 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(4) (2012).
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(as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C.
§ 802 (2012)).”66 Treatment is how a PPD gets marked as mentally ill
in the first place.
Thinking about gun restrictions in a logical fashion, given the low
prevalence of violence among PPDs as demonstrated by scientific
research,67 the people who are seeking treatment for their disabilities
are not the people who are most likely to be dangerous—on the
contrary.68 But only by seeking treatment in the first place does a
person get “tagged” as “mentally ill” for the purposes of Scalia’s
reasoning in the Heller majority opinion. For example, in the
introduction for this Article, I described a woman who sought
treatment at a hospital, placing herself on the psychiatric “radar” so
to speak. Her presence at the hospital where she sought treatment put
her at risk of involuntary commitment for temporary psychosis caused
by medication for poison ivy. But her involuntary commitment would
have tagged her as mentally ill and likely interfered with her ability to
purchase or even own a gun.69 If the woman in my hypothetical were
a devout gun owner, would this risk of losing her guns have had a
chilling effect on her seeking of treatment? This question leads me to
my second point.
If a person is a devout gun owner, but might otherwise have
considered seeking treatment for a psychiatric disability, this targeting
of the mentally ill as the scapegoat for gun violence will likely scare
her away from seeking treatment. It is hard enough to seek
psychiatric help: treatment is expensive; treatment is stigmatizing;
treatment is often difficult to come by as fewer and fewer psychiatrists
participate with health plans or accept new patients.70 Adding another

66. Id. § 922(d)(3).
67. See supra notes 14 and 21 and accompanying text (summarizing the scientific
research on the low rates of violence among PPDs despite the misconceptions of the
public).
68. On the contrary, PPDs are more likely to be the victims of violence. See supra
note 15 and accompanying text.
69. See Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 922(d)(4), 82 Stat. 1213, 1220
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(4) (2012)) (prohibiting any person from
“sell[ing] or otherwise disposing of any firearm or ammunition to any person knowing or
having reasonable cause to believe that such person has been adjudicated as a mental
defective or has been committed to any mental institution”); National Instant Criminal
Background Check System, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/nics (last visited Jan. 25,
2015) (providing general information about National Instant Criminal Background Check
System (“NICS”) and its purpose).
70. Brian Krans, Study: Half of Psychiatrists Don’t Accept Health Insurance,
HEALTHLINE (Dec. 11, 2013), http://www.healthline.com/health-news/mental-half-ofpsychiatrists-dont-take-health-insurance-121113 (“Though mental health parity laws are in
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barrier to treatment—loss of gun rights—means that a person who
might have sought help may not do so. Should this devout gun owner
present at the hospital with her troubles, she might fear that she runs
the risk of involuntary commitment—and loss of her guns—a risk that
she is less likely to run if she simply stays away from doctors
altogether.
Thus, the Court has targeted the wrong group for gun bans
(those who voluntarily sought treatment and are thus least likely to be
dangerous) and scared off another group from treatment altogether
(making them more likely to be a public health problem because they
go untreated). At best, the scapegoating of the mentally ill in Heller is
terrible public policy.
IV. SCAPEGOATS AND EMERGENCY INVOLUNTARY CIVIL
COMMITMENT
As Prendergast, Price, Pryal, and other disability scholars have
noted, people with psychiatric disabilities (“PPDs”) struggle for
agency—legal, rhetorical, and otherwise.71 Prendergast writes, “If
people think you’re crazy, they don’t listen to you.”72 But the stakes
are higher these days, as Prendergast notes, due to the quasicriminalization of mental illness: “[T]he question of how one listens to
the mentally ill in an age in which they have been oppressed by the
effective criminalization of their condition becomes vital.”73 The
quasi-criminalization of mental illness has come to the fore recently
for a variety of reasons, including public debate that has pushed
emergency involuntary civil commitment (“ICC”) as a “Precrime”74
solution to spree-killing tragedies such as the Washington Navy Yard
shooting of September 2013.75 Other reasons include the use of jails

effect, the head of the American Psychiatric Association says ‘intimidating’ experiences
with insurance companies keep some psychiatrists from accepting coverage.”).
71. MARGARET PRICE, MAD AT SCHOOL: RHETORICS OF MENTAL DISABILITY AND
ACADEMIC LIFE 58–102 (2011); Catherine Prendergast, On the Rhetorics of Mental
Disability, in EMBODIED RHETORICS: DISABILITY IN LANGUAGE AND CULTURE 189,
203 (Martin Nystrand & John Duffy eds., 2003); Katie Rose Guest Pryal, The Genre of the
Mood Memoir and the Ethos of Psychiatric Disability, 40 RHETORIC SOC’Y Q. 479, 479
(2010).
72. Prendergast, supra note 71, at 203.
73. Id.
74. See Philip K. Dick, The Minority Report, in THE PHILIP K. DICK READER 323,
323 (1987) (creating a fictional world in which mutants can see future crimes before they
are committed and Precrime agents can arrest and imprison the potential criminals before
they commit the crimes).
75. See infra Part III.A (discussing in greater detail the spree-killing at the
Washington Navy Yard).
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and prisons as quasi-mental hospitals in decades since the closure of
public hospitals (deinstitutionalization) and the poor treatment of
PPDs while they are incarcerated.76
In the direct aftermath of a spree-killing, debates over
emergency ICC come to the fore.77 Largely missing from these public
debates over emergency ICC are the voices of mentally ill people
themselves—at least for a while—even though they would be most
affected by any changes in the law.78 Their voices are missing because
the genres in which these public debates take place—news reports
and opinion pieces published in major news outlets, for example—
rhetorically exclude them—either by disallowing their participation or
encouraging PPDs with nonvisible disabilities to keep their
disabilities hidden. For example, claiming mental illness as part of
one’s identity would hurt a journalist’s credibility (ethos) as an
impartial writer, or an opinion writer’s credibility as a reasoned
arguer, as mental illness, as perceived by the U.S. public, ruins a
person’s ability to think in a reasoned and impartial fashion. After all,
“To be disabled mentally is to be disabled rhetorically.”79
Even more troubling, these genres reveal a convergence of
opinion from the left and the right, an agreement that PDDs often
pose a danger to the public and should be subject to less strict
procedural protections when facing emergency ICC.80
In this section, I show how this disabling rhetoric operates by
examining popular news articles and other documents that were
published after the Navy Yard shooting committed by Aaron Alexis,

76. See, e.g., Cassidy, supra note 17 (“In Wyoming as well as around the country, jails
and prisons operate as de facto mental health facilities, treating a disproportionately high
number of offenders with mental illnesses, substance abuse issues and often both.”);
Rikers Island Jail Criticised for Keeping Mentally Ill Inmates in Solitary, GUARDIAN (Nov.
6, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/06/rikers-island-jail-mentally-illsolitary-confinement/ (“About 40% of Rikers’ 12,200 inmates have some kind of mental
health diagnosis, and about a third of those have so-called serious mental illnesses such as
schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. Of the roughly 800 inmates in solitary at any given
time, just over half of them are mentally ill.”).
77. See infra Part III.C (detailing the discussion of public debates over ICC after the
spree-killing at the Washington Navy Yard). The examples in this Part invoke earlier
spree-killings to make their arguments.
78. In the immediate aftermath of a spree-killing, the voices of PPDs are often
missing in reasoned debate. See infra Part III.C. However, as time passes, articles appear
in which the voices of PPDs are present. See, e.g., Electra Draper, Debate Rages in
Colorado over Involuntary Holds for Mental Illness, DENVER POST (May 25, 2014, 12:01 AM),
http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_25831191/debate-rages-colorado-over-involuntary-holdsmental-illness.
79. Prendergast, supra note 71, at 202.
80. See convergence of opinion discussion infra Part III.C.
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a man widely believed to be mentally ill at the time, revealing the
predictable rhetorical patterns.81 I highlight two of the most common
of these genres: (1) early reports breaking news of Alexis’s mental
illness and (2) opinion pieces arguing for easing the emergency ICC
standard as a Precrime solution to spree-killing violence—and
revealing a convergence of the political left and right.
A. Emergency Involuntary Civil Commitment Statutes: What Is at
Stake?
After the Washington Navy Yard shooting in Washington, D.C.,
on September 16, 2013, in which a single shooter named Aaron Alexis
shot twelve people to death and wounded eight others,82 criticisms
rang out from many corners. One popular criticism noted how easy it
was for Alexis to access a military base.83 A second criticism dealt
with guns; some asked how it was that Alexis could have lawfully
purchased one, given his arrest record and history of mental
instability84 (invoking the scapegoating argument Scalia makes in
Heller). Others, such as the National Rifle Association’s (“NRA”)
Wayne LaPierre, criticized the military for not allowing all soldiers on
military bases such as the Navy Yard to carry guns.85 LaPierre
81. See infra Parts III.B & III.C (providing rhetorical analyses of the documents,
revealing these patterns).
82. See, e.g., 12 Victims Killed, 8 Wounded in Shooting at D.C. Navy Yard, Suspected
Gunman Killed, NBC WASH. (Sept. 17, 2013, 3:37 PM), http://www.nbcwashington.com/
news/local/Confirmed-Shooter-at-Navy-Yard-One-Person-Shot-223897891.html.
83. See, e.g., Carol D. Leonnig, Matea Gold & Tom Hamburger, Military’s
Background Check System Failed to Block Gunman with a History of Arrests, WASH. POST
(Sept. 17, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/contractor-would-not-havehired-aaron-alexis-if-past-brushes-with-law-had-been-known/2013/09/17/e5bc83da-1faa11e3-8459-657e0c72fec8_story.html (“The military’s beleaguered background-check
system failed to block Navy Yard gunman Aaron Alexis from an all-access pass to a halfdozen military installations, despite a history of arrests for shooting episodes and
disorderly conduct.”); see also Trip Gabriel, Joseph Goldstein & Peter Schmidt, Suspect’s
Past Fell Just Short of Raising Alarm, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com
/2013/09/18/us/washington-navy-yard-shootings.html (“[T]he access granted Mr. Alexis, a
former Navy reservist who as an independent contractor serviced Navy computers, raises
questions similar to those raised about another outside government contractor, Edward J.
Snowden, who leaked national intelligence secrets.”).
84. See, e.g., Alex Koppelman, Aaron Alexis’s Guns, NEW YORKER (Sept. 17, 2013),
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/aaron-alexiss-guns (“It appears that he
bought his shotgun legally—reportedly last week, in Virginia. He was allowed to buy a
firearm despite having apparently struggled with mental illness, and despite his
involvement in some disturbing gun-related incidents.”).
85. See, e.g., id. (“Some conservatives are starting to argue that the problem at the
Navy Yard was actually that there weren’t enough guns present—that Democrats have
turned military bases into ‘gun-free zones’ where even trained combat veterans are
vulnerable to lone madmen.”).

CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1439 (2015)

1460

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93

famously stated after the Navy Yard shooting, “When the good guys
with guns got there, it stopped.”86
Another set of critics asked why the police—and the state
generally—are unable to more easily involuntarily commit mentally
ill people on an emergency basis. These critics argued that such
people, including Alexis, are “clearly disturbed”—at least that is how
the New Yorker put it.87 And, as one can imagine, the language
describing PPDs in such articles went downhill from there, creating
distance between the in-group (the sane) and the scapegoated group
(PPDs). These critics want to loosen the emergency ICC standards
across all states.88 Essentially, the authors of these genres argue that
because of outliers such as Alexis, all laws affecting all PPDs should
be changed to allow for easier emergency ICC of all PPDs.
Before delving into the genres that argue for easing the
procedural standards for emergency ICC, let us examine what is at
stake in this debate: the emergency ICC statutes themselves. Every
state has its own version of an emergency ICC standard under which
a person can be detained under certain circumstances.89 For example,
North Carolina’s statute is a typical “dangerousness” statute, one that
uses a “threat to self or others” standard to determine whether a
person can be held for evaluation.90 About half of U.S. states have
dangerousness statutes like North Carolina’s.91 The statute provides
that “[a]nyone who has knowledge of an individual who is mentally ill
and either (i) dangerous to self, . . . or dangerous to others, . . . or (ii)
in need of treatment in order to prevent further disability or
deterioration that would predictably result in dangerousness . . . ” to
submit an affidavit and petition the court to take such person into
custody for evaluation by a physician or psychologist.92 Note that the

86. Andy Meek, NRA’s Wayne LaPierre: “Good Guys with Guns” Could Have
Stopped Navy Yard Shooting, TIME (Sept. 22, 2013), http://nation.time.com/2013/09/22/
nras-wayne-lapierre-good-guys-with-guns-could-have-stopped-navy-yard-shooting/.
87. Andrew Solomon, An Avoidable Tragedy: Aaron Alexis and Mental Illness, NEW
YORKER (Sept. 20, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2013/09/
psychiatry-mass-shootings-aaron-alexis-mental-illness.html.
88. See infra Part III.C (discussing the articles arguing for loosening the emergency
ICC standard).
89. An annotated list of each state’s ICC statutes can be viewed on the website for the
Treatment Advocacy Center, a nonprofit mental health organization. See Emergency
Hospitalization for Evaluation, TREATMENT ADVOC. CENTER, http://www.treatmentadvocacy
center.org/legal-resources/state-standards/2275 (last visited Jan. 26, 2015).
90. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-261 (2014).
91. See Emergency Hospitalization for Evaluation, supra note 89.
92. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-261(a).
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statute also allows commitment if the person’s lack of self-care makes
the person a danger. This is also typical.
But there have been major changes to the dangerousness
standard in other states: the other half of U.S. states have changed
their emergency ICC laws from a dangerousness standard to a “need
for treatment” standard, or else added the need for treatment
standard to the dangerousness standard to make it easier to
involuntarily hold a person.93 In Wisconsin, for example, a state agent
may detain a person who meets the traditional dangerous standard,94
or who shows either “[a] substantial probability of physical
impairment or injury to himself or herself due to impaired judgment,
as manifested by evidence of a recent act or omission.”95 or
“[b]ehavior manifested by a recent act or omission that, due to mental
illness or drug dependency, he or she is unable to satisfy basic needs
for nourishment, medical care, shelter, or safety without prompt and
adequate treatment.”96 The Wisconsin statute is thus far more
expansive than the North Carolina statute, allowing officers to
involuntarily commit any person they suspect of having a mental
illness and who seems unable to provide self-care—even if the person
does not seem dangerous. The Wisconsin statute retains the
dangerousness standard, but it adds, as an option for the state, the
need for treatment standard, giving officers more leeway in
emergency ICC.
These statutes allow the state (in the form of police or another
state agent) to apprehend and involuntarily hospitalize for evaluation
a person who meets the standard under which a person can be
detained in that jurisdiction, e.g., dangerousness, need for treatment,
or some combination of both.97 The state procedures usually work
like this: A person arrives at a hospital and acts in a way that meets
the statutory standard (e.g., apparently dangerous or in need of
treatment). The hospital staff then detains the person. Or if the
person behaves in a way that meets the statutory standard in public,
the police detain the person and bring him or her to a hospital.98

93. For a state-by-state comparison, see Emergency Hospitalization and Evaluation,
supra note 89.
94. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51.15(1)(a)(1), (2) (West 2012).
95. Id. § 51.15(1)(a)(3).
96. Id. § 51.15(1)(a)(4).
97. What follows is a summary of the procedures across the United States, drawn
from CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN ET AL., LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL
AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS 810–11 (5th ed. 2009).
98. Id.
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Once the person arrives at a hospital, the hospital’s psychiatric
lock-down ward can hold the person for forty-eight or seventy-two
hours with mere probable cause or a similarly low standard, often
upon the examination by only one or two doctors.99 After the first
hold period, another examination must take place, and sometimes a
hearing before a judge (which can be by phone).100 After this
examination, a patient can be held for another two weeks or even
longer.101 None of this procedure rises to the procedural requirements
of true involuntary civil commitment, which requires a more complete
judicial process, as all of this procedure is operating on an emergency
basis.102
After the Navy Yard shooting, the opinion pages of newspapers
across the United States were plastered with calls for easing the
emergency ICC standard as a way to prevent future tragedies.103 This
call for more ICC is a classic scapegoat argument: if we can just lock
away the potential wrongdoers, then there will be no more
wrongdoing. The objects of our fear will be permanently isolated, and
we—those that remain—will be safe. Underlying this Precrime
argument is the belief that the scapegoats (the mentally ill) are to
blame for society’s ills (unsafe gun use).
The procommitment opinion piece was not the only genre that
emerged after the Navy Yard shooting, however, and viewing this
genre alongside others can help reveal how these genres emerged and
how they scapegoated PPDs. Prior to the procommitment arguments
came the early news reports breaking the story of Alexis’s mental
illness. Following on the heels of these news reports came the
arguments for easing the emergency ICC standard—in direct response
to the news of Alexis’s mental illness. As the next section shows, the
news reports, which came first, laid the groundwork for the
arguments for easing the emergency ICC standard.
B.

Post-Shooting News Report Genre

Before the policy debates began over ICC, news reports broke
the story of the shooting and personal information about Aaron
Alexis. Of the articles that fall into the news-report genre, I examine
specifically the news reports that broke the story of Aaron Alexis’s

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See discussion infra Part III.C.
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psychiatric disability.104 These reports share predictable conventions
(that is, traits or characteristics) that arose in response to the rapidly
evolving postcrisis situation involving a likely mentally-ill spreeshooter. For example, they share conventions with news reports that
have appeared after other similar tragedies, such as the shootings in
Tucson, Arizona, in 2011.105
The breaking news reports share some strong generic similarities
(see Table 2). First, the authors of the news reports are journalists for
major news outlets such as the Associated Press, Reuters, the
Washington Post, or CNN. For each piece, either the venue or the
author possesses great respectability as a news source. Despite this
(or because of this) respectability, the articles tend to lead with wacky
headlines that make Alexis sound as “crazy” and “other” as possible.
For example, one such article was titled, “Aaron Alexis, Navy Yard
Shooting Suspect, Thought People Followed Him with Microwave
Machine.”106 The articles then begin with quick summary paragraphs
that highlight how “delusions” caused Alexis to go on a shooting
rampage.107 These headlines work in not-so-subtle ways to push
Alexis into an outsider scapegoat position by making him seem
strange, bizarre.
104. To find articles that fit this parameter, I used the search engine Google, the search
terms “Aaron Alexis,” and a search time frame of September 2013. I pulled the top fifteen
articles that Google presented. A quick read revealed that those published on September
17, 2013, did not contain accurate information or any information on Alexis’s mental
health. I thus limited my search from September 18, 2013, to September 30, 2013.
105. Shortly after the shootings in Tucson, Arizona, in 2011 by Jared Loughner, similar
news reports emerged, pointed to the mental illness of Loughner, his brushes with the
mental health system, and the system’s failure to prevent the violence. See Pryal, supra
note 22, at 159–67. Media articles covering tragedies that get classified as “terrorism,” such
as the Boston Bombing, share a different set of conventions. Enumerating all of these
conventions is beyond the scope of this article. However, they often deemphasize the
mental health of the attacker.
106. Eric Tucker, Aaron Alexis, Navy Yard Shooting Suspect, Thought People Followed
Him with Microwave Machine, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 18, 2013, 5:12 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/18/aaron-alexis-microwave-machine_n_3946916.html;
see Peter Hermann & Ann E. Marimow, Navy Yard Shooter Aaron Alexis Driven by Delusions,
WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ local/crime/fbi-police-detailshooting-navy-yard-shooting/2013/09/25/ee321abe-2600-11e3-b3e9-d97fb087acd6_story.html.
107. See, e.g., Associated Press, VA Sheds Light on Mental Health of Navy Yard
Gunman Aaron Alexis, CBS.COM (Sept. 18, 2013, 4:41 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com
/news/va-sheds-light-on-mental-health-of-navy-yard-gunman-aaron-alexis/; Greg Botelho
& Joe Sterling, FBI: Navy Yard Shooter “Delusional,” Said “Low Frequency Attacks”
Drove Him to Kill, CNN.COM (Sept. 26, 2013, 12:25 PM), http://www.cnn.com
/2013/09/25/us/washington-navy-yard-investigation/ (“Aaron Alexis was under ‘the
delusional belief that he was being controlled or influenced by extremely low frequency
electromagnetic waves’ before he embarked on a bloody shooting rampage at the
Washington Navy Yard, an FBI official said Wednesday.”).
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Table 2: Early Reports Breaking News of Alexis’s Mental Illness
Authors and
Venues




Conventions of
Genre





Purpose of Genre






Authors are journalists for major news
sources including unattributed pieces
for AP/Reuters.
Venues are CNN.com, CBS.com,
Washington Post, USA Today, AP &
Reuters via Huffington Post (i.e., major
news outlets).
Headline emphasizing craziness of
Alexis.
Opening summarizing how delusions.
drove Alexis, proof from his own
writings and inscriptions on his gun.
Evidence emphasizing the failure of
military and gun-purchase background
checks.
To pinpoint a motive for the killings
(i.e., the delusions).
To place blame for the killings (e.g., on
mental health care failures, gun control
failures, or government background
check failures).
To make Alexis an outsider/scapegoat.

When the articles are read together, their shared purposes
emerge. The articles primarily search for a motive for the killings—
Alexis’s delusions—and search for someone or something to blame.
Alexis seems without motive; article after article point out that he
shot people at random and did not act out of revenge.108 Furthermore,
due to his illness, he also seems relatively blameless in the sense that
he lacked a “guilty mind” or “intent.” He is also dead (shot dead at
the scene by government agents)109 and therefore no longer around
for us, as a society, to punish. Thus, lacking a wrongdoer to blame, the
news reports shift blame to other places. They point to Alexis’s
employer, a government contractor whose background check system
108. See, e.g., Hermann & Marimow, supra note 106 (noting that “investigators believe
that Alexis fired at random”).
109. See 12 Victims Killed, 8 Wounded in Shooting at D.C. Navy Yard, Suspected
Gunman Killed, supra note 82.
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with the Department of Defense gave Alexis access to the Navy Yard
in the first place.110 They point to the ease with which the obviously
crazy Alexis legally purchased the shotgun he used in the killings (in
the state of Virginia).111 The articles also point to an interaction with
the police in Rhode Island in the weeks before the shooting, when
Alexis told police that he was being stalked and arguably acted
paranoid and delusional.112 The Rhode Island police did not detain
him because they did not believe he was dangerous113—that is, he did
not meet the dangerousness standard for emergency ICC. By
highlighting Alexis’s erratic behavior, the articles also work to
scapegoat Alexis (and others like him), pushing him into an external,
outsider position. They also subtly (or not-so-subtly) argue for easing
the emergency ICC standard.114
The opinion genres that followed the news reports dealt with the
different argument topics first touched on in the news reports: Who
was to blame for the failure to screen out Alexis as a government
contractor? How can we limit access to guns for PPDs? Should we
ease emergency ICC standards? These different arguments, spawned
by the news reports, moved across genres into opinion pieces,
political speeches, and others. The news reports posed this question,
some patently, some latently: Is our emergency ICC process, at least
in part, to blame for these killings? This question was bolstered by the
click-bait headlines and laser-sharp focus on Alexis’s mental state.
The opinion-writing commentariat, from both sides of the political
spectrum, responded: Yes.

110. See Gabriel, Goldstein & Schmidt, supra note 83 (noting that there was “a
growing list of questions about how Mr. Alexis, who had a history of infractions as a Navy
reservist, mental health problems and run-ins with the police over gun violence, gained
and kept a security clearance from the Defense Department that gave him access to
military bases, including the navy yard, where he was shot to death by the police”); see
also Miranda Green, A Visit to Sharpshooters, Where Aaron Alexis Bought His Shotgun,
DAILY BEAST (Sept. 18, 2013), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/09/18/a-visit-tosharpshooters-where-aaron-alexis-bought-his-shotgun.html (noting that Sharpshooters
customers did not see a connection between gun control and the Navy Yard shooting,
attributing the violence instead to “the government’s security clearance system”).
111. See Green, supra note 110 (interviewing members of the gun range where Alexis
bought his shotgun, where one member stated, “[I]t’s a mental health
issue. . . . [S]omebody who is sensible is not going to do the wrong thing”).
112. See sources cited supra notes 106–07.
113. See sources cited supra notes 106–07.
114. See infra Part III.C (discussing proposed changes to the Emergency ICC
standard).
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Involuntary Civil Commitment Opinion Piece Genre

The news reports revealed that Aaron Alexis had a run-in with
the police in Newport, Rhode Island, just weeks before the Navy
Yard shooting. On August 7, 2013, while he was staying in a Newport
hotel room, he called the police, reporting that “people were talking
to him through the walls and ceilings of his hotel rooms and sending
microwave vibrations into his body to deprive him of sleep.”115
Despite his words, the police did not detain Alexis because he did not
seem dangerous to them. Thus, the debate over the dangerousness
standard and emergency ICC came to the fore. This debate took
place, in part, on the opinion pages of major news outlets. These
opinion pieces emerged as a genre, sharing certain conventions (that
is, traits or characteristics) driven by the particular events of the Navy
Yard shooting. They also shared conventions with similar pieces that
emerged after spree-killing tragedies in the past.116
Table 3 outlines the conventions of the ICC opinion piece genre
that arose in mainstream publications. The table contains only
observations of the genre’s conventions based on the sample studied:

115. Associated Press, supra note 107.
116. To find articles to fit this parameter, I used the search engine Google, the search
terms “Aaron Alexis” and “need for treatment,” (both in quotation marks), with no time
limiter. “Need for treatment” is the technical term for the legal standard that states adopt
to loosen their civil commitment standards. I pulled all articles from major news sources
that this search revealed. I did not pull from personal blogs or websites or from advocacy
sites. I pulled over twenty different articles.
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Table 3: Opinion Pieces Arguing for Easing the Emergency
Involuntary Civil Commitment Standard
Authors and Venues






Conventions of
Genre









Authors include politicians,117
psychiatrists,118 and writers who have
published books about mental illness.119
One author published a major memoir
in 1998 about his recovery from
depression; he also has a doctorate in
psychology.120
Venues include major news outlets such
as the Washington Post and USA
Today.
Pieces link together the tragedies
leading up to Navy Yard shooting (e.g.,
Tucson, Aurora, and Newtown) to point
out a trend of violence and mental
illness.
Pieces insist that mental illness is just
like any other illness and needs
treatment, but most mental illness goes
untreated.
Pieces point out that most mentally ill
are not violent, but also imply or openly
state a connection between untreated
mental illness and spree-killings.
At the end, pieces argue that
“dangerousness” standard is too high,
and we should adopt “need for

117. See, e.g., Ron Barber, A First Step in Addressing the Mental Health Aspect of Mass
Shootings, HILL (Feb. 12, 2014, 8:00 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congressblog/healthcare/198134-a-first-step-in-addressing-the-mental-health-aspect-of-mass.
118. See, e.g., Sally L. Satel, We Have the Tools to Prevent Another Shooting Spree,
BLOOMBERGVIEW (Sept. 19, 2013, 4:16 PM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/
2013-09-19/we-have-the-tools-to-prevent-another-shooting-spree.48.
119. See, e.g., Pete Earley, Op-Ed., Deeds Attack Shows that Our System Is a Mess,
USATODAY (Nov. 21, 2013, 5:26 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/11/20/
pete-earley-creigh-deeds-mental-illness/3654793/ [hereinafter Earley, Deeds Attack]; Pete
Earley, Op-Ed., Getting the Mentally Ill the Help They Need, WASH. POST (Sept. 27, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-lower-threshold-for-committing-mentally-illpeople/2013/09/27/52350fac-26bb-11e3-b75d-5b7f66349852_story.html [hereinafter Earley,
Getting the Mentally Ill Help].
120. Andrew Solomon, Biography, ANDREWSOLOMON.COM, http://andrewsolomon.com/
andrew-solomon-biography/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2015).
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treatment.”
To argue that mentally ill people need
greater access to medical treatment.
To point out that PPDs will not seek
this treatment for themselves, so we
must intervene and force treatment
upon them.
To argue that ICC must be easier or the
mentally ill will “slip through the social
fabric,” (as Solomon and those on the
left put it) or commit more spreekillings (as those on the right put it).

As Table 3 illustrates, the authors included public leaders, such
as politicians, medical experts, such as psychiatrists, and popular
figures in the psychiatric disability, world such as those who have
published memoirs about mental illness. The big-name venues that
published these pieces calling for easier ICC standards, such as The
New Yorker and the Washington Post, gave credence to the
arguments.
One troubling aspect of this genre becomes apparent when you
study its conventions: the pieces uniformly call for the “need for
treatment” standard despite the authors’ similarly uniform
observation that most PPDs are not violent, especially not towards
others.121 The authors tend to strike a sympathetic tone, verging on
paternalistic, stating that they only want to get PPDs the treatment
that they need. But then the authors take a darker turn: they link the
Navy Yard shooting to what they argue is a pattern of spree-killings
committed by PPDs122 and suggest that the only way to stop these
killings is to ease the emergency ICC standards.123 Logically, this
argument suggests that all PPDs are potentially prone to violence.
Thus, the authors of these articles seem to speak out of both sides of
their mouths.
121. See, e.g., Satel, supra note 118 (“As a psychiatrist, I have frequently seen psychotic
patients brought into the emergency room by police, only to be released into the night
because of a toxic combination of restrictive commitment laws and a desperate shortage of
psychiatric beds. For the most part, such sad stories affect only the patients themselves and
their families.”).
122. Id. (“The most important component of reform, however, is to ensure that these
legal tools are used. Arizona, where Jared Lee Loughner shot Representative Gabrielle
Giffords and 17 others in 2011, has a need for treatment standard.”).
123. Id. (“States shouldn’t stop there. More should adopt an even more progressive
type of commitment statute: the ‘need for treatment’ standard.”).
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Like the news report genre, many authors of the ICC genre were
nondisabled people. With the ICC genre, these nondisabled people
were making proposals for how to deal with PPDs that included ways
to more easily confine them involuntarily. Such arguments
prominently made by nondisabled people have prompted the
disability rights movement to argue with slogans such as “Nothing
About Us Without Us.”124
Only two writers examined here arguably could claim authority
to speak on behalf of PPDs, rather than just about them. The first
such writer, Pete Earley, is the author of a book about navigating the
mental health system on behalf of his son, who has bipolar disorder.125
In arguing—forcefully, in multiple major venues—for a need for
treatment standard for ICC, Earley calls upon his negative
experiences trying to get care for his son.126 In other words, even
though his position is one of a sympathetic advocate for PPDs, he is
arguing that it should be easier to involuntarily commit PPDs. As
disability studies scholar Melanie Yergeau and others have noted,
advocacy groups composed predominantly of family members of
people with disabilities often have markedly different agendas than
do people with disabilities themselves.127 Earley, by arguing for easing

124. See, e.g., JAMES I. CHARLTON, NOTHING ABOUT US WITHOUT US: DISABILITY
OPPRESSION AND EMPOWERMENT, at ix–x (2000) (arguing that oppression of people with
disabilities is rooted in their dependency and disempowerment, and urging nondisabled
people to recognize that disabled people know what is best for themselves).
125. PETE EARLEY, CRAZY: A FATHER’S SEARCH THROUGH AMERICA’S MENTAL
HEALTH MADNESS (2007).
126. See Earley, Getting the Mentally Ill Help, supra note 119. In an article arguing for
easing the ICC standard, Earley quickly summarizes two negative encounters he had with
mental health-care providers when he tried to get his son involuntarily committed:
In 2002, a Fairfax County emergency room turned me away because my collegeage son, who was delusional and had been hospitalized twice for treatment of
bipolar disorder, was deemed not sick enough to hospitalize. Police advised me to
claim he was dangerous to get him admitted. Three years later, I called the
county’s Mobile Crisis Unit for help but was again told that I had to wait until my
son became dangerous. When he did, that unit refused to come because the
dispatcher decided, based on my call, that my son was too dangerous. Instead, the
police came and shot my son twice with a stun gun.
Id. One might wonder what Earley’s son thinks about being used as the poster boy in the
national media for easing the standards for ICC. All we can do is wonder because Earley’s
son Kevin (Mike in Earley’s writing) is not writing the op-eds for national newspapers.
Kevin did get some airtime on his dad’s blog in 2014, however. Kevin Earley, If You Are
Afraid to Tell Your Story, Stigma Wins, PETEEARLEY.COM (July 14, 2014),
http://www.peteearley.com/2014/07/14/son-says-afraid-tell-story-stigma-wins/.
127. See generally, Melanie Yergeau, Circle Wars: Reshaping the Typical Autism Essay,
30 DISABILITY STUD. Q. 1 (2010) (pointing out that a “typical convention of the typical
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the standard to need for treatment, claims to speak for what is best
for PPDs, including his son, yet what he is arguing for is the same
scapegoating tactic—rounding up the potential wrongdoers, the
Precrime approach—albeit with softer language.
The second writer that could arguably be said to be speaking on
behalf of PPDs, Andrew Solomon, wrote about Aaron Alexis and
argued for the need for a treatment standard (thereby easing the
emergency ICC standard) in The New Yorker.128 Solomon has
published two famous “mood memoirs”129 about his own major
depression.130 Unlike Earley, however, Solomon does not draw on his
own experience with mental illness in his opinion piece on ICC and
the Navy Yard shooting. On the contrary, he creates rhetorical
distance between himself and Alexis, whom he says suffered from
“derangement,” was “clearly depressed,” and was “delusional”—
among other things.131 Rather than claiming authority to speak on the
issue as a PPD, Solomon claims authority as a scientist: he uses
scientific terms and relies upon his education, a doctorate in
psychology from Cambridge University.132 Indeed, Solomon’s article
is titled, “An Avoidable Tragedy,”133 falling squarely into the genre
described here. The way Solomon positioned himself as a scientist
and distanced himself from the “delusional” Alexis suggests that he
does not want to be mistaken for a member of the scapegoated group
(PPDs), at least not in a piece in which he argues for a Precrime
solution to spree-killings. Thus, although Solomon has made a living
writing memoirs of his own severe psychiatric disability, he is quick to

autism essay [is] where experts on autism [including family members] know more than
those with autism”).
128. Solomon, supra note 87.
129. For more on the memoir genre and the psychiatrically disabled, see, for example,
Pryal, supra note 71, at 489, arguing that “mood memoirs” can be read as narrative-based
responses to the rhetorical exclusion suffered by the psychiatrically disabled, and
Catherine Prendergast, Mental Disability and Rhetoricity Retold: The Memoir on Drugs, in
CHANGING SOCIAL ATTITUDES TOWARD DISABILITY: PERSPECTIVES FROM
HISTORICAL, CULTURAL, AND EDUCATIONAL STUDIES 60, 65 (David Bolt ed., 2014),
pointing out how memoirs of the psychiatrically disabled “document[] the experience of
psychosis—and ensuring relief from it—from the inside.”
130. ANDREW SOLOMON, THE NOONDAY DEMON: AN ATLAS OF DEPRESSION 11
(2001); Andrew Solomon, Anatomy of Melancholy, NEW YORKER, Jan. 12, 1998, at 46,
46–61. Solomon has published more books on psychiatric disability, including, more
recently, ANDREW SOLOMON, FAR FROM THE TREE: PARENTS, CHILDREN AND THE
SEARCH FOR IDENTITY (2012).
131. Solomon, supra note 87.
132. Solomon, supra note 120.
133. Solomon, supra note 87.

CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1439 (2015)

2015]

HELLER'S SCAPEGOATS

1471

place himself in the in-group, rather than the scapegoated group, in
his article on Alexis and emergency ICC.
For example, Solomon writes at the conclusion of his piece: “But
until we develop a social model that includes finding and treating
those who suffer from these complaints, we will be subjected to
scenes like the one at the Navy Yard over and over again.”134 This
language evokes fear of the scapegoated group—of the deranged,
paranoid, spree-killer on the loose just waiting to commit another
atrocity. His solution is to “find and treat” those who might harm us.
He contrasts Alexis’s case to the 1999 school shooting at Columbine
High School, located in Jefferson County, Colorado: “Some
shootings, like Columbine, are perpetrated by people of whom no one
would ever have expected such violent acts. Those events, which
appear random, will be difficult to contain.”135 However, Alexis’s
situation was not like the situation in Columbine: “But many are
perpetrated, as this one was, by people who are clearly disturbed.
Some cases are hard to pick up. Alexis’s was not.”136 Solomon’s
position, then, is a gentler version of Precrime: we must “find”
perpetrators before they commit spree-killings, and we must “treat”
them to prevent the spree-killings. One can ask: What does
“treatment” entail? And is it voluntary? What are we willing to
subject PPDs to against their will to create a feeling of safety for
ourselves? And given the “Columbine Exception” that Solomon
describes, what is the point?
Furthermore, Solomon does not write from a position in which
he identifies himself with the scapegoated Alexis. That Solomon
himself is a PPD who suffered from terrible depression and shared his
suffering publicly does not cause him to express empathy with Alexis
in his piece. Rather, his language in the article places himself within
the in-group and further externalizes and scapegoats Alexis.
D. The Left and Right Converge on Emergency Involuntary Civil
Commitment
After the Navy Yard shooting, one of the more inflammatory
public commentators on PPDs, NRA executive vice president Wayne
LaPierre, said this: “If we leave these homicidal maniacs on the
street . . . they’re going to kill. . . . They need to be committed is what
they need to be. If they are committed, they’re not at the Naval

134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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Yard.”137 LaPierre said this on NBC’s “Meet the Press” shortly after
the Navy Yard shooting.138 Earley, the father of a PPD, and Andrew
Solomon, himself a PPD, both argued, also, for easing the emergency
ICC standard and giving the state more power to round up PPDs and
treat them against their will.139 LaPierre’s political stance could not be
farther from Earley’s and Solomon’s. Their tone and word choice
could not have been more different. But they were arguing essentially
the same position: easing the emergency ICC standard will prevent
spree-killing tragedies like the one at the Navy Yard. Locking up the
maniacs will keep the rest of us safe. These are scapegoating
arguments, which sacrifice PPDs to make the rest of us feel better.
CONCLUSION
Most jurisdictions, including the federal government, have laws
banning firearm ownership by persons with certain histories of mental
illness.140 The National Instant Criminal Background Check System,
or NICS, helps implement these laws.141 These laws vary and
change,142 but currently they are unified under our popular and
political discourse that follows every spree-killing such as the one at
the Washington Navy Yard. The Navy Yard tragedy prompted the
NRA’s Wanye LaPierre’s comments that redirected public anger

137. Joan Lowy, NRA: Get “Homicidal Maniacs” Off Streets, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Sept. 22, 2013, 2:13 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/nra-get-homicidal-maniacs-streets.
138. Id.
139. See supra notes 87, 126 and accompanying text.
140. The Federal Gun Control Act, under which NICS is implemented, provides as
follows: “It shall be unlawful for any person to sell or otherwise dispose of any firearm or
ammunition to any person knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that such
person . . . has been adjudicated as a mental defective or has been committed to any
mental institution.” Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 922(d)(4), 82 Stat.
1213, 1220 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(4) (2012)).
141. Id.
142. But see United States v. Rehlander, 666 F.3d 45, 46–50 (1st Cir. 2012) (suggesting
that the mentally ill should have a right to carry guns until they receive a hearing declaring
them unfit to use a gun [this opinion came out in large part due to Heller]). See Ian
Millhiser, First Circuit Suggests the Mentally Ill Cannot Lose Their Right to Buy or Carry
Guns Without a Hearing, THINKPROGRESS (Jan. 23, 2012, 6:10 PM),
http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2012/01/23/409334/first-circuit-suggests-the-mentally-illcannot-lose-their-right-to-buy-or-carry-guns-without-a-hearing/. Given that the emergency
hospitalization procedures do not require an adversarial proceeding, they are not
sufficient to justify a permanent deprivation of the individual’s Second Amendment rights.
Rehlander, 666 F.3d at 46–50. Because the private right to bear arms is a constitutional
right, it requires more due process. Id. at 49–50. The court acknowledged that deprivation
of this right is still appropriate for those who are mentally ill or dangerous, id. at 50, but
the Rehlander decision narrowed the scope of the Gun Control Act’s application to the
mentally ill.

CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1439 (2015)

2015]

HELLER'S SCAPEGOATS

1473

away from guns and towards people with mental illness. But
LaPierre’s arguments are merely a hamfisted manifestation of a
scapegoating that we are all complicit in, including Scalia, Breyer, and
the NRA: PPDs are the sacrificial receptacle for the ritual
unburdening of our nation’s sin of gun violence, even though PPDs
are irrefutably responsible for so little of it.143 PPDs just make the
news because they undergird the national conversation about guns.
There cannot be a newsworthy murder any longer without a
newscaster asking, “Was he crazy”? Mental illness is the go-to
explanation to explain away gun violence.
When gun advocates and gun-control advocates talk about the
right to bear arms, both sides say, “Well, except for the maniacs.”
This common refrain is the refrain of scapegoating.
Reading Heller, and the debates surrounding emergency ICC, it
is difficult to see that PPDs also have the fundamental right to own a
gun and protect their homes; it is as though PPDs are, in Second
Amendment terms, no longer people at all. Indeed, emergency ICC,
at its most fundamental level, completely removes a person from his
or her home. We do not ask, are PPDs actual people with homes,
hearths, and families in need of protection at all? When we speak of
the ease with which PPDs should lose their gun rights and be
involuntarily committed, the answer appears to be: No, they are not.

143. See supra notes 14 and 21 for studies on the low correlation between PPDs and
violence; note 15 for research showing how PPDs are far more likely to be the victims of
violence than to perpetrate it; and note 7 for research showing the correlation between
spree-killings (which are anomalies) to the rest of the gun violence that occurs annually in
the United States.
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